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CHAPTER 1: INTERPRETING GLOBAL SECURITY 
Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall 
 
This book aims to make sense of the transformations our theories and practices of global 
security have undergone in the past quarter century. Global security could once be 
described in terms of the actions and interactions of sovereign states with hierarchical and 
authoritative political institutions directing police forces and organized militaries to deal 
with internal and external threats (Buzan and Hanson 2009: 66-100). The security of the 
state was assumed to imply the security of citizens and communities. The state was 
presumed to act in the ‘national interest’ and to seek to maximize its economic and 
military power to secure that interest (Morgenthau 1951). Global security was often 
understood in terms of the ‘balance of power’ between states and alliances of states 
(Waltz 1979). International organizations and international law were sometimes thought 
to restrain political and military elites, but only within limits (Claude 1962). The world of 
global security, in other words, was one of power-seeking states keeping the peace at 
home and fighting wars – or threatening to fight – abroad.  
 
This understanding of global security is now widely seen as obsolete by both theorists 
and practitioners. Most now believe that all states are now subject to new transnational 
challenges – human and environmental – that are not easily addressed by old, statist 
responses. Established, Western states now address security challenges in new ways, 
employing new modes of governance and even engaging private actors to deal with 
particular problems (Krahmann 2003). We now recognize many non-Western states lack 
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authoritative political institutions, police forces or organized militaries (Bates 2008). 
Most theorists and practitioners now acknowledge that the security of the state does not 
always imply the security of citizens and communities (Buzan 1991). States are often 
predators rather than protectors, acting not in the ‘national interest’, but in that of 
sectional interests. Strengthening the power of the state can – and frequently does – mean 
increasing the insecurity of individuals and groups. In this context, global security can no 
longer be understood just in terms of states, balances, or institutions, but requires new 
frameworks of analysis and new political practices (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). 
  
This book is one response to that demand for new frameworks of analysis. Collectively 
the essays engage with the various theories of global security that have emerged since the 
end of the Cold War and the practices with which they are associated. To introduce this 
account of global security, we must first describe the interpretive approach to social 
science, for the account of global security found in this book arose out of an experiment 
with interpretive theory (see Bevir, Daddow and Hall 2013). Next we consider the way 
this interpretive theory transforms our understanding of global security and the complex 
picture of global security that emerges from the essays in this book. Finally, we conclude 
by considering the lessons learnt for the future of an interpretive theory of international 
relations especially in the study of global security. 
 
 
INTERPRETIVE THEORY 
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Although the essays in this book cover a range of cases of global security, they all adopt 
an interpretive approach. Following interpretive theory, they ask these questions: 
 
1.  What elite beliefs informed security policies and practices? How did national 
and local elites conceive, for example, of the balance of power, the national 
interest, economic development, and global security? 
2.   What traditions underpinned these beliefs? Are there rival traditions inspiring 
competing policies and conflicting actions? 
3.   Did the relevant beliefs, policies, and practices change over time. If so, what 
dilemmas led people to change their beliefs and how did the relevant actors 
conceive those dilemmas? 
 
Our interpretive theory can thus be introduced through its use of the three key concepts 
found in these questions: beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas. 
 
 
Why beliefs? 
 
As early as the 1950s, philosophers were forcefully criticizing positivism and its concept 
of pure experience (Quine 1961: 20-46). Yet international relations scholars have often 
failed to take seriously the consequences of rejecting a positivist notion of pure 
experience. Many cling tenaciously to the positivist idea that we can understand or 
explain human behaviour by objective social facts about people rather than by reference 
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to their beliefs. They thus exclude the interpretation of beliefs from the ambit of the 
discipline on positivist grounds. Other international relations scholars reject positivism, 
distancing themselves from the idea of pure experience, but still abstain from 
interpreting beliefs. Often, they try to avoid direct appeals to beliefs by reducing beliefs 
to intervening variables between actions and social facts (see especially Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993).  
 
Interpretive theorists argue, however, that once we accept that there are no pure 
experiences, we undermine the positivist case against interpreting beliefs. A rejection of 
pure experience implies that we cannot reduce beliefs to intervening variables. When we 
say that a state has particular interests for which it will go to war, we rely on a particular 
theory to derive its interests from its global role and position. Someone with a different 
set of theories might believe that the state is in a different global position or that it has 
different interests. The important point here is that how the people we study see their 
position and interests inevitably depends on their theories, which might differ 
significantly from our theories.  
 
To explain peoples’ actions, we implicitly or explicitly invoke their beliefs and desires. 
When we reject positivism, we cannot identify their beliefs by appealing to the allegedly 
objective social facts about them. Instead, we must explore the beliefs through which 
they construct their world, including the ways they understand their position, the norms 
affecting them, and their interests. Because people cannot have pure experiences, their 
beliefs and desires are inextricably enmeshed with theories. Thus, international relations 
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scholars cannot ‘read-off’ beliefs and desires from objective social facts about people. 
Instead they have to interpret beliefs by relating them to other beliefs, traditions, and 
dilemmas. 
 
Of course, international relations scholars have grappled with the issues arising from a 
rejection of positivism (see, for example, Booth, Smith and Zalewski 1996). Today the 
leading theories of global security are realism, institutionalism (in which category we 
include most forms of constructivism) and rational choice. But even advocates of these 
theories have begun to question their positivist inheritance – and as they have 
disentangled themselves from positivism, so they have placed greater stress on 
interpreting beliefs. New theories, including critical, feminist and postmodern theories, 
have also emphasised beliefs but commonly tend to appeal to material or ideational 
structures to explain actions (Buzan and Hanson 2009: 187-225). Although we welcome 
this semi-interpretive turn, we think it is still worthwhile drawing on interpretive theory 
to highlight the ambiguities that thus characterize these theories.  
 
Realists are generally the most steadfast in rejecting beliefs as explanations. Classical 
realists commonly argue that theorists and policymakers must look to material 
capabilities to assess threat and set aside any consideration of the declared intentions of 
others (Morgenthau 1948). Structural realists seek to explain actions by reference to the 
distribution of power between states in international systems (Waltz 1979). Although so-
called neo-classical realists depart from both of these positions, looking to the 
perceptions of state elites about their relative power in order to explain state behaviour, 
 6 
they still treat beliefs as intervening variables (Rose 1998). Realism can thus only take 
us part way towards an interpretive account of contemporary global security. 
 
Institutionalists are often unclear about the nature of institutions. On the one hand, 
institutions are said to take a concrete and fixed form. They are often defined, for 
example, as operating rules or procedures that govern the actions of the individuals who 
fall under them (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). If institutionalists think of institutions in 
this way, they lapse back into positivism.  They do not interpret what institutions mean 
to the people who work within them. They elide the contingency, inner conflicts, and 
several constructions of actors in an institution. They assume that allegedly objective 
rules prescribe or cause behaviour. Yet, as we have just argued, international relations 
scholars cannot legitimately ‘read off’ peoples’ beliefs from their social location. Rules 
are always open to interpretation.  
 
On the other hand, institutions are sometimes said to include cultural factors or beliefs, 
which may seem to suggest that institutions do not fix the beliefs or actions of the 
subjects within them. If international relations scholars open institutions in this way, 
however, they cannot treat institutions as given. Rather they must ask how beliefs, and 
so actions, are created, recreated, and changed in ways that constantly reproduce and 
modify institutions. Although we would welcome this decentring of institutions, we 
would suggest that the theory would no longer be institutionalist in any significant sense. 
Explanations would no longer cast as if behaviour were the result of rules but, rather, in 
a way that presented actions and outcomes as the contingent and contested results of the 
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varying way in which people understood and reacted to conventions. Appeals to 
institutions would thus be misleading shorthand. 
 
This commentary on institutionalism suggests that, if we reject positivism, our notion of 
an institution desperately needs a micro-theory. Institutionalists could avoid engaging 
with beliefs and preferences only when they believed that they could reduce actions to 
social facts. But positivism undermines just that belief, making a theory of individual 
action necessary. It thus seems plausible to suggest that rational choice theory has had a 
significant impact on the new institutionalism precisely because it is a theory about 
individual preferences and rational action. 
 
Because rational choice theory views actions as rational strategies for realizing the 
preferences of the actor, it has sometimes reduced the motives of political actors to self-
interest (Downs 1957). Yet, as most rational choice theorists now recognize, there are no 
valid grounds for privileging self-interest as a motive. Rational choice theorists have 
thus enlarged their notion of preference, moving toward a ‘thin’ analysis of that requires 
only that motives be consistent. The problem for rational choice theorists has thus 
become how to fill out this ‘thin’ notion of preference on specific occasions. At times, 
they do so by suggesting that preferences are more or less self-evident or that 
preferences can be assumed from the positions people occupy. Obviously, however, this 
way of filling out the idea of preference falls prey to our earlier criticism of positivism. 
At other times, therefore, rational choice theorists have suggested conceiving of people’s 
actions as products of their beliefs and desires without saying anything substantive about 
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what these beliefs and desires might be (Vicchaeri 1993: 221-4). Here too although we 
would welcome this decentring gesture, we would suggest that the theory would no 
longer be rational choice theory in any significant sense. Explanations would be based 
not on deductions drawn from assumptions of self-interest and utility-maximization, but 
on appeals to people’s multiple, varying, and diverse beliefs and desires.  
 
The purpose of our theoretical reflections is not to undermine all appeals to institutions 
and rules as explanations of action. Our arguments do not prevent appeals to self-interest 
or the use of deductive models. We do not deny that quantitative techniques have a role 
in the study of global security. To reject any of these concepts or tools outright would be 
hasty and ill-considered. Our theoretical reflections imply only that international 
relations scholars need to tailor their appeals to institutions, rationality, models, and 
statistics to recognize that their discipline is an interpretative one focused on the beliefs 
of relevant actors.  
 
Why traditions? 
 
The forms of explanation we should adopt for beliefs, actions, and practices revolve 
around two sets of concepts (Bevir 1999: 187-218 and 223-51). The first set includes 
concepts such as tradition, structure, and paradigm. These concepts explore the social 
context in which individuals think and act. They vary in how much weight they suggest 
should be given to the social context in explanations of thought and action. The second 
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set includes concepts such as dilemma, anomaly, and agency. These concepts explore 
how beliefs and practices change and the role individual agency plays in such change. 
 
We define a tradition as a set of understandings someone receives during socialization. 
Although tradition is unavoidable, it is so as a starting point, not as something that 
governs later performances. We should be cautious, therefore, of representing tradition 
as an unavoidable presence in everything people do in case we leave too slight a role for 
agency. In particular, we should not imply that tradition is constitutive of the beliefs 
people later come to hold or the actions they then perform. Instead, we should see 
tradition mainly as a first influence on people. The content of the tradition will appear in 
their later actions only if their agency has led them not to change it, where every part of 
it is in principle open to change.  
 
Positivists sometimes hold that individuals are autonomous and avoid the influence of 
tradition. They argue that people can arrive at beliefs through pure experiences, so we 
can explain why people held their beliefs by referring to those experiences. But once we 
reject positivism, we need a concept such as tradition to explain why people come to 
believe what they do. Because people cannot have pure experiences, they necessarily 
construe their experiences using theories they inherited. Their experiences can lead them 
to beliefs only because they already have access to the traditions of their community. 
 
A social heritage is the necessary background to the beliefs people adopt and the actions 
they perform. Some international relations scholars, including some critical theorists and 
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postmodernists, adopt a strong version of this conclusion. They argue that a social 
structure, paradigm, episteme, identity or discourse governs not only the actions people 
can perform successfully but also people’s beliefs and desires. Strong structuralists 
argue that meanings and beliefs are the products of the internal relations of self-
sufficient languages or paradigms. They thus leave little, if any, room for human agency. 
They suggest that traditions, structures, or paradigms determine or limit the beliefs 
people might adopt and so the actions they might attempt. 
 
Surely, however, social contexts only ever influence – as distinct from define – the 
nature of individuals. Traditions are products of individual agency. This insistence on 
agency may seem incompatible with our earlier insistence on the unavoidable nature of 
tradition. However, our reasons for appealing to tradition allow for individuals to change 
the beliefs and practices they inherit. Just because individuals start out from an inherited 
tradition does not imply that they cannot adjust it. On the contrary, the ability to develop 
traditions is an essential part of people’s being in the world. People constantly confront 
at least slightly novel circumstances that require them to apply inherited traditions anew, 
and a tradition cannot fix the nature of its application. Again, when people confront the 
unfamiliar, they have to extend or change their heritage to encompass it, and as they do 
so, they develop that heritage. Every time they try to apply a tradition, they reflect on it 
(whether consciously or not) to bring it to bear on their circumstances, and by reflecting 
on it, they open it to innovation. Thus, human agency can produce change even when 
people think they are sticking fast to a tradition they regard as sacrosanct. 
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As humans, people necessarily arrive at their beliefs, and perform their actions, against 
the background of a tradition that influences those beliefs and actions, but they are also 
creative agents who have the capacity to reason and act innovatively against the 
background of that tradition. We are here discussing something like the familiar problem 
of structure and agency. Like the structuralists, interpretive theory rejects the idea of the 
self-constituting person. But, unlike many structuralists, interpretive theory does not 
deny the possibility of agency. It is this commitment to the possibility of agency that 
makes tradition a more satisfactory concept than rivals such as structure, paradigm, and 
episteme. These later ideas suggest the presence of a social force that determines or at 
least limits the beliefs and actions of individuals. Tradition, in contrast, suggests that a 
social heritage comes to individuals who, through their agency, can adjust and transform 
this heritage even as they pass it on to others. 
 
Recognition of agency requires international relations scholars to be wary of essentialists 
who equate traditions with fixed essences to which they credit variations.  Interpretive 
theory here presents tradition as a starting point, not a destination. It thus implies that 
instances cannot be identified with a tradition based on a comparison of their apparently 
key features. 
 
A particular relationship must exist between beliefs and practices if they are to make up 
a tradition. For a start, the relevant beliefs and practices must have passed from 
generation to generation. Traditions must be made up of beliefs and practices relayed 
from teacher to pupil to pupils' pupil and so on. Such socialization may be intentional or 
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unintentional. The continuity lies in the themes developed and passed on over time. As 
beliefs pass from teacher to pupil, so the pupil adapts and extends the themes linking the 
beliefs. Although there must a historical line from the start of a tradition to its current 
finish, the developments introduced by successive generations might result in beginning 
and end having nothing in common apart from the links over time. Nonetheless, an 
abstract set of beliefs and practices that were not passed on would be a summary at one 
point in time, not a tradition. It would not relate moments in time to one another by 
showing their historical continuity. A tradition must consist of a series of instances that 
resemble one another because they exercised a formative influence on one another. 
 
In addition to suitable connections through time, traditions must embody suitable 
conceptual links. The beliefs and practices a teacher passes on to a pupil must display a 
minimal level of consistency. A tradition could not have provided someone with an 
initial starting point unless its parts formed a minimally coherent set. Traditions cannot 
be made up of purely random beliefs and actions that successive individuals happen to 
have held in common.  
 
Although the beliefs in a tradition must be related to one another both temporally and 
conceptually, their substantive content is unimportant. As tradition is unavoidable, all 
beliefs and practices must have their roots in tradition, whether they are aesthetic or 
practical, sacred or secular, legendary or factual, pre-modern or scientific. Our idea of 
tradition differs, therefore, from that of people who associate the term with customary, 
unquestioned ways of behaving (Oakeshott 1962: 123 & 128-9). At the heart of our 
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notion of tradition are individuals using local reasoning consciously and subconsciously 
to reflect on and modify their contingent heritage. 
 
 
Why dilemmas? 
 
Dilemmas provide one way of thinking about the role of individual agency in changing 
traditions. People’s capacity for agency implies that change originates in the responses 
or decisions of individuals. Whenever someone adopts a new belief or action they have 
to adjust their existing beliefs and practices to make way for the newcomer. To accept a 
new belief is thus to pose a dilemma that asks questions of one’s existing beliefs. A 
dilemma here arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in opposition 
to existing beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of these existing beliefs 
and associated tradition. Scholars of international relations can explain change in 
traditions, therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas. Traditions change as 
individuals make a series of variations to them in response to any number of specific 
dilemmas. 
 
It is important to recognize that scholars cannot straightforwardly identify dilemmas 
with allegedly objective pressures in the world. People vary their beliefs or actions in 
response to any new idea they come to hold as true. They do so irrespective of whether 
the new idea reflects real pressures, or, to be precise, irrespective of whether it reflects 
pressures that scholars of international relations believe to be real. In explaining change, 
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we cannot privilege our academic accounts of the world. What matters is the subjective, 
or more usually, intersubjective, understandings of political actors, not our scholarly 
accounts of real pressures in the world. The task of the social scientist is to recover the 
shared intersubjective dilemmas of the relevant actors. The task is not to privilege 
scholarly accounts, although, of course, the pressures social scientists believe to be real 
may closely resemble the actors’ views of the relevant dilemmas.  
 
Dilemmas often arise from people’s experiences. However, we must add immediately 
that this need not be the case. Dilemmas can arise from theoretical and moral reflection 
as well as experiences of worldly pressures. The new belief that poses a dilemma can lie 
anywhere on a spectrum from views with little theoretical content to complex theoretical 
constructs only remotely linked to views about the real world. A good example is the 
notion of globalization. Globalization is one dilemma that admits of many 
interpretations. Hay (2002) distinguishes between the economic outcomes of 
globalization and the effects of the discourse of globalization. The economic effects 
include the straightforward theory that high taxation drives capital away, a view for 
which there is little evidence. Nonetheless politicians act as if there is a link between 
taxation and capital mobility and reduce taxes. The social construction of globalization 
thus becomes crucial to explaining political actions. 
 
A related point to make here is that dilemmas do not have given, nor even correct, 
solutions. Because no set of beliefs can fix its own criteria of application, when people 
confront a new event or belief they necessarily change traditions creatively. It might 
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look as if a tradition can tell people how to act; how to respond to dilemmas. At most, 
however, the tradition provides a guide to what they might do. It does not provide rules 
fixing what they must do. A tradition can provide hints on how its adherents might 
respond to a dilemma. But the only way to check if an individual’s actions are consistent 
with the beliefs of a tradition is to ask whether the individual and other adherents of the 
tradition are happy with the relevant actions. Because individuals respond creatively to 
dilemmas, it follows that change is ubiquitous. Even when people think they are merely 
continuing a settled tradition or practice, they are typically developing, adjusting, and 
changing it. Change can occur when people think they are sticking fast to a tradition. 
Traditions and practices could be fixed and static only if people never met and faced 
novel circumstances. But, of course, people are always meeting new circumstances. 
International relations are in perpetual motion. 
 
Although dilemmas do not determine solutions, the scholar of international relations can 
explain the solutions at which people arrive by appealing to the character of both the 
dilemma and their existing beliefs. Consider first the influence of the character of the 
dilemma. To hold on to a new idea, people must develop their existing beliefs to make 
room for it. The new idea will open some ways of adjusting and close down others. 
People have to hook it on to their existing beliefs, and their existing beliefs will present 
some opportunities and not others. People can integrate a new belief into their existing 
beliefs only by relating themes in it to themes already present in their beliefs. Change 
thus involves a pushing and pulling of a dilemma and a tradition to bring them together. 
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INTERPRETIVE THEORY AND GLOBAL SECURITY  
 
Interpretive theory has led us to concentrate on the meanings and beliefs of various policy 
actors, and, crucially, to explain these beliefs by locating them in historical traditions and 
as responses to dilemmas. The essays that follow examine how shifts in beliefs and 
traditions, as well as new dilemmas, explain changes in the ways problems of global 
security have been addressed by the representatives of states and non-state actors. They 
generally highlight, therefore, the contingency, diversity, and contestability of the 
narratives, expertise, and beliefs informing global security practices. For, following 
interpretive theory, they suggest that practices embody beliefs and these beliefs are laden 
with the inheritances of various traditions. This emphasis on contingency, diversity, and 
contestability distinguishes the picture of global security provided by this book from its 
rivals. In what follows, we suggest that this book thereby challenges the aspiration to 
comprehensive and formal explanations that often lurks within accounts of global 
security. In particular, although the chapters in this book echo themes from the literature 
on global governance, they also transform those themes, providing examples of the 
decentring of a governance account of global security. Finally, this book thereby opens 
novel research topics, including the study of ruling narratives, rationalities, and 
resistance. 
 
 
Challenging comprehensive theories 
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Most existing pictures of global security typically aspire to a kind of comprehensiveness 
that is associated with more formal modes of explanation. That is to say, they tend to 
obscure the variety and contingency of present-day global security precisely because they 
reduce it to a formal pattern or cause that defines or explains its other leading features.  
 
Structural realism, for example, aims to provide a general explanation for why certain 
outcomes occur in international relations. It appeals to the nature of the units (sovereign 
states) to account for the structure of the system (anarchical) and then to the structure of 
the system to account for the actions of the units (power-seeking) (Waltz 1979). 
Structural realists thus account for contemporary practices of global security by referring 
theorists and practitioners to the distribution of power in the present international system 
and the ‘unipolar’ order that it supposedly generates (Ikenberry, Mastanduno and 
Wohlforth 2009). Similarly, institutionalism and constructivism appeal to rules or norms 
within institutions to account for the actions of individual agents, non-state actors or 
states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Wendt 1992). Establishing the key relevant rules or 
norms provides a general explanation for particular actions.  
 
Finally, the literature on global governance generally characterizes the new governance in 
terms of being a response to globalization (Rosenau 1987). It suggests that globalization 
has caused a decline in the importance and capacity of state actors as they confront new 
transnational challenges and become increasingly dependent on one another and on non-
state actors. The result has allegedly been the spread of networks involving civil society 
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actors at the expense of both states and international institutions. Likewise, the spread of 
networks allegedly explains the greater reliance of states and international institutions on 
‘trust’ and ‘cooperative’ styles of management. From this perspective, global security 
under the new governance is more or less inherently about growing fragmentation, 
specialization, transnationalism, and the involvement of civil society. 
 
It is only because all these existing accounts of global security aspire to 
comprehensiveness based on formal explanations that they appear to be in tension with 
one another. If present-day global security is entirely about unipolarity, it cannot be about 
rule-following or new transnational challenges. Likewise, if it is about norms or 
globalization, it cannot be about American ‘hegemony’.  
 
Interpretive theory does away with formal explanations and thus the aspiration to 
comprehensive accounts of global security. Here the aspiration to a comprehensive 
account of global security implies that we can define it by reference to one or more of its 
essential properties. The implications are that these properties are general ones that they 
characterise all present-day security arrangements. Several international relations 
scholars also imply that these essential properties can explain at least the most significant 
other features of contemporary global security. In contrast, our interpretive theory makes 
all these implications seem implausible. From an interpretive perspective, security 
practices are products of people’s actions. People’s actions are not fully determined by 
anarchical structures, institutional rules, or some logic of globalization, but rather reflect 
their agency and intentionality. Global security is thus constructed differently by 
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numerous actors grappling with different issues in different contexts against the 
background of different traditions. A better grasp of present-day global security might 
arise, therefore, from accepting that it does not have any essential properties. 
 
In this book, we treat ‘global security’ as a loose phrase that refers to a number of 
theories and practices with overlapping features, none of which need always be present. 
These can include theories and practices associated with realism, institutionalism and 
constructivism, and global governance, since all of these can be located in the beliefs and 
actions of agents in the field. We can find them directing state ministries and militaries to 
try to fulfil certain tasks and we can find them working through international 
organizations or NGOs to try to establish patterns of rule or to steer other actors. Equally, 
however, accounts of the new global governance can reveal the myriad ways in which 
these actors are thwarted and their aspirations and policies subverted by other actors 
utilising other theories and practices. It is important to remember, in particular, that states 
and international institutions meet other policy actors who challenge, ignore, or simply 
misunderstand them. Below them they meet voluntary and private sector actors in civil 
society and transnational networks. Level with them or above them, they confront other 
states and transnational organizations. Global security involves contestation at the levels 
of both theory and practice. 
 
 
Decentring global governance 
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There are obvious overlaps between our interpretive theory and its emphasis on a 
variegated picture of security and the account of security associated with the literature on 
global governance and security governance in particular (Krahmann 2003; Kirchner and 
Sperling 2007; Adler and Greve 2009). Both highlight the limited role, power, and 
effectiveness of states and international institutions. Both also draw attention to the role 
of transnational actors and networks. Despite these overlaps, however, interpretive theory 
transforms the concept of global governance. In particular, interpretive theory decentres 
global governance in a way that creates a new perspective on the topics that dominate 
much of the relevant literature. 
 
Most discussions of ‘global governance’ combine attention to new topics with a formal 
theory that presents these topics as interlinked features of a new world order (e.g. 
Rosenau 1987). In the first place, the literature on global governance suggests that this 
new world has come about as a result of globalization and its more or less inexorable 
systemic effects. In the second place, global governance draws attention to the diverse 
processes and domains of global security. Global governance is often defined in terms of 
any activity that contributes to transnational and international patterns of rule (Rosenau 
1995). Global governance includes not only the actions of states and international 
institutions, but also the actions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Global 
governance thus shifts attention from sovereign states in an anarchic international society 
to the creation, enforcement, and change of global patterns of activity. Similarly, global 
governance and security governance broaden the research agenda from attempts to 
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prevent and limit war to also encompass attempts to manage failed states, civil wars, 
terrorism, and the global environment. 
 
Interpretive theory promotes many of the same topics as does the literature on global 
governance. But it presents these topics less as arising from a new world of globalization 
and more as arising out of its theoretical break with the kind of formal theories that have 
come to dominate so much of the study of international relations. From the perspective of 
this interpretive theory, global security under global governance does not fit into a neat 
formal and monolithic pattern. On the contrary, the point of the term ‘governance’ is in 
part to provide a more diverse view of authority, political action, and ruling. The notion 
of states alone interacting in an anarchic international system was always a formal myth. 
The myth obscured the reality of diverse international practices that escaped the control 
of states and international institutions because they arose from the contingent actions of 
diverse actors at the boundaries of states and civil societies. The alleged ‘new’ features of 
global governance may have spread, but they have always been there. International 
regimes arise variously from the interactions of international institutions, states, and other 
policy actors in networks of organisations. Transnational flows and international links 
have always disrupted borders. Patterns of rule have always crossed the public, private, 
and voluntary sectors. The boundaries between states and civil societies have always 
been blurred. Global governance is (and always has been) a complex policy environment 
in which an increasing number of actors are forging various practices by deploying a 
growing range of strategies and instruments across multiple jurisdictions, territories, and 
levels of government. 
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To understand today’s global governance and global security, international relations 
scholars might appeal not to systemic logics of anarchy or globalization but to new forms 
of knowledge and the traditions on which theorists and practitioners draw. In so far as 
security practices have changed, it is because policy actors have adopted new ideas that 
have led them to remake the world (Bevir and Hall 2011). Perhaps the most important of 
these ideas have been neoliberal economics, which inspired a greater use of markets and 
market mechanisms, and the planning and network theories that inspired the spread of 
‘whole-of-government’ and ‘joined-up’ approaches to governance in many sectors, 
including that of security. In chapter 2, Mark Bevir and Ian Hall analyse the post-Cold 
War emergence of these ideas and associated practices in response to a series of 
dilemmas that provoked theorists and policymakers to question inherited traditions of 
thought and practice. As interpretive theory rejects appeals to a systemic logic inherent 
arising from anarchy or globalization, so it decentres the topics associated with global 
governance as a paradigm for thinking about global security. That is to say, the security 
practices associated with terrorism, failed states, and civil wars all appear now as 
products of contingent patterns of activity infused by beliefs that arose against the 
background of clashing traditions. 
 
 
New research topics 
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To decentre global governance is to challenge any straightforward dichotomy between it 
as a ‘new’ mode of thinking about and practicing international relations and a supposedly 
older anarchical international system dominated by states. As we suggested earlier, many 
‘new’ features of global governance may have spread to new actors and new areas, but 
many have longer histories than commonly acknowledged. Contemporary global 
governance, in the field of global security as in other fields, mixes the old and the new. 
Elite actors may be addressing new dilemmas with new practices using new forms of 
knowledge, but they may continue to do so in the belief that states remain the dominant 
actors on the international stage. Any account of global security must surely include an 
account of various states and to their fumbling efforts to realize their policy goals. In 
chapters 2 to 7, the authors explore a series of these attempts by actors in particular states 
to achieve their objectives, sometimes utilising old theories and practices, and sometimes 
utilising new ones. 
 
In this way, interpretive theory decentres states and regional institutions. States no longer 
appear as black-boxes – formal entities that necessarily act in ways defined by their place 
in a system or their apparently fixed interests. State policies are, rather, products of 
struggles among actors inspired by different beliefs rooted in different traditions. 
Interpretive theory thus foregrounds a set of distinctive research topics, including ruling 
narratives, rationalities, and resistance. All these topics reflect a shift from formal and 
systemic modes of explanation to the recovery of the contingent and contested beliefs of 
policy actors, whether these actors are linked to civil associations, states, transnational 
organizations, or international institutions.  
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Ruling narratives are the beliefs and stories by which elite actors make sense of their 
world. These narratives provide a background against which elites construct their 
worldviews, including their views of their own interests. Ruling narratives thus inform 
the policy choices that elites and states make. So, when international relations scholars 
study ruling narratives, they might ask, for example: what elite beliefs inform national 
security policy-making? How and why have realist narratives been modified or replaced 
by other traditions? What changes in elite beliefs generated these new ruling narratives? 
What dilemmas prompted these changes in elite beliefs?  
 
Rationalities are expert strategies – the technical forms of knowledge – on which policy 
actors rely to design policies to realize their goals. These rationalities often arise from the 
formal explanations associated with present-day social science. They purport to tell 
policy makers what effects markets, laws, networks, and specific policies will have. So, 
international relations scholars might explore the forms of expertise, especially from the 
social sciences, have influenced national security policy-making and other practices in 
global security. They might ask: How do these rationalities aim to address perceived 
dilemmas? What effects have been produced by the growth of civilian and military 
funding to academic disciplines like social anthropology and social network analysis? 
What influence have other rationalities had on policy-making and implementation, 
especially those generated in disciplines such as International Relations?  
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Finally, resistance occurs because other actors can thwart the intentions of elites. 
Subordinate actors can resist elites and transform policies by reacting to them in ways 
that draw on their local traditions and their local reasoning. They can react to policies in 
ways that are contrary to the models and predictions of social scientists with their social 
rationalities. Here, therefore, international relations scholars might pose questions such 
as:  what beliefs and traditions have shaped changed modes of resistance to the ruling 
narratives and rationalities? How have realists thwarted newer traditions of thinking 
about national security? What other beliefs and traditions have driven movements within 
national security bureaucracies, universities, think-tanks and other locations that have 
tried to block the rise of new narratives and rationalities?  
 
In the next chapter, Mark Bevir and Ian Hall show how new policy agendas arose from 
new security challenges in the post-Cold War period, as well as how policymakers in 
Western states generated new practices of ‘security governance’ from new theories of 
international relations and new theories of public administration. They examine the 
emergence of new narratives and new rationalities in security governance. In chapters 3 
and 4, Sabine Selchow and Daniel Zoughbie explore other ruling narratives. They 
examine the different ways in which elite American practitioners confronted 9/11 and its 
aftermath by drawing upon inherited beliefs and practices, as well as applying new 
thinking to the problem of radical Islamist terrorism. Selchow concentrates on the 
‘newness’ of radical Islamist terrorism and the challenge that it poses to the ‘New 
World’, as well as the return, as she puts it, of ‘uncertainty’ to American narratives about 
global security. Zoughbie, for his part, analyses the ways in which President George W. 
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Bush draw upon his religious beliefs and his understanding of the Christian tradition to 
underpin his foreign and security policies during his terms in office. 
 
Chapter 5 to 7 examine the changing nature of ruling narratives in a series of European 
states. Oliver Daddow and Jamie Gaskarth chart the shift from what they call ‘value 
protection’ to ‘value promotion’ in British foreign and security policy, emphasising the 
ways in which post-Cold War practitioners have re-interpreted Britain’s role as a ‘global 
power’. Aglaya Snetkov explores the re-casting of Russia’s security policy under 
Vladimir Putin, arguing that his government’s approach to contemporary security 
architecture was grounded not simply in a critical assessment of the 1990s, but also in a 
new narrative about Russian history and the imperative to be an anti-Western power. 
Jocelyn Mawdsley, in her chapter, compares the approaches of Britain, France and 
Germany to the dilemmas posed by missile defence, tracing their differing responses to 
differing narratives of national roles and national histories. 
 
In chapter 8, Adrian Gallagher analyses post-Cold War responses to the dilemmas 
generated by genocides and ethnic violence after 1991. He argues that both scholars and 
practitioners tended to couch these responses in terms of the United Nations Charter, 
curiously neglecting other possible starting points, including the Genocide Convention. 
His chapter both points to the ways in which ruling narratives emerge and the ways in 
which possible alternatives to those narratives are sidelined within elite debate. 
Christopher Baker-Beall explores similar themes in chapter 9, examining the emergence 
and development of different narratives about terrorism in the European context. 
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In the final chapter, Hartmut Behr turns to a past interpretivist approach – that of Hans J. 
Morgenthau. Behr argues that Morgenthau’s insistence on the inescapability of 
‘standortgebunden’ (stand-points) for social and political theorists. Like other 
interpretivists, Behr suggests, Morgenthau appreciated the contingency of social and 
political knowledge, as well emphasising the need for what he calls ‘epistemological anti-
hubris’. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This book aims to address the need for new frameworks of analysis for contemporary 
practices of global security that go beyond inherited theories. It also aims to move 
beyond the positivist rejection of beliefs and the tendency of post-positivists, in 
International Relations at least, to neglect beliefs as a way of explaining actions. 
International theorists from E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau onwards have been very 
sceptical about explaining practices by reference to the beliefs of agents, arguing that we 
have few or no means of knowing what they belief and why (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 
1948). This book suggests that this scepticism is unwarranted. We can gain reliable 
knowledge of the beliefs of others and we can assume that at least some professions of 
belief are sincere. Moreover, we have means of assessing the sincerity or otherwise of 
professed beliefs by subjecting them to well-worn means of analysis.  
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With all of this in mind, this book argues that beliefs are central to explanation in social 
science and that international theorists should not be so wary of interpreting beliefs and 
explaining actions by reference to beliefs. It opens up new topics for research and new 
approaches to those topics that cannot be utilised within conventional positivist and post-
positivist modes of analysis prevalent in international relations. It aims to move the field 
beyond theories that aspire to comprehensiveness and thus fail to account for old and new 
practices that fall outside their purview. It aims to demonstrate that global security is best 
understood as a set of decentred practices responding to multiple dilemmas and grounded 
in overlapping theories derived from different traditions. 
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